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Abstract
We develop a structural model of a ¯rm that uses a technology with both ¯xed
and variable capital and is subject to both borrowing constraints and irreversibil-
ity of ¯xed capital. We show that the premium of marginal productivity over the
user cost of variable capital is a theoretically consistent indicator of the intensity of
¯nancing constraints. We use this result to develop a new test of the presence of ¯-
nancing constraints on ¯rm investment: if a ¯rm is subject to borrowing constraints,
then the indicator should be monotonously decreasing in the ¯nancial wealth of the
¯rm, conditional on the productivity shock and on the stock of ¯xed capital. We
test this hypothesis on a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing ¯rms.
The indicator is estimated using a panel of balance sheet data and the ¯nancing
constraints hypothesis is not rejected for all the ¯rms in the sample except the larger
ones. Importantly, the validity of this test is strongly supported by an independent
source of qualitative information: ¯rms with a high value of the indicator are three
times more likely to state problems in ¯nancing investment than ¯rms with a low
value, even conditional on their size.
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11 Introduction
In order to explain the aggregate behaviour of investment and production, it is important
to understand the factors that determine the investment decisions of ¯rms. Some authors
argue that the availability of internal ¯nance may be important in explaining these deci-
sions. It may a®ect the ability of ¯rms to invest when external ¯nance is not available.
Financiers may be unwilling to fund pro¯table investment opportunities because once the
funds have been handed to the ¯rms, contractual and/or informational problems may pre-
vent the ¯nanciers from appropriating their share of the revenues from the investment's
output (Besanko and Thakor (1986), Milde and Riley (1988), Hart and Moore (1998),
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2000)). It is therefore important to verify empirically
whether or not ¯nancing constraints a®ect the investment decisions of ¯rms. A literature
started by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) focuses on the consideration that, if
¯rms are unable to raise external ¯nancing, they only invest when internally generated
funds become available. Several studies1 show that this seems to be the case: investment
is signi¯cantly correlated with proxies for changes in net worth or internal funds, and such
correlation is most important for ¯rms likely to face capital-market imperfections.
The motivation of this paper is that this result has been seriously questioned as evi-
dence of ¯nancing constraints on ¯rm investment. Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000)
¯nd that the cash °ow-investment correlation is stronger for ¯rms which are ¯nancially
very wealthy and, according to their selection criteria, surely not ¯nancially constrained2.
More generally, Kaplan and Zingales claim that there is no theoretical support for the fact
that the cash °ow-investment sensitivity is monotonously increasing in the intensity of
¯nancing constraints. This claim has been proved recently by Gomes (2001) in a general
equilibrium framework, while both Gomes (2001) and Ericson and Whited (2001) show
that measurement errors are the most likely cause of the positive correlation between
investment and cash °ow.
In this paper we adopt a di®erent approach. We develop a structural model of ¯rm
1See Hubbard (1998) for a review of this literature.
2Similar evidence is showed by Cleary (1999), who studies a larger sample of 1317 US ¯rms.
2investment with both ¯nancing constraints and irreversibility of ¯xed capital, and we
use it to derive a theoretically consistent procedure to test for the presence of ¯nancing
constraints on ¯rm investment. We consider a ¯rm which has the opportunity to invest
in a risky technology which generates output using two complementary factors of pro-
duction, ¯xed and variable capital. Both factors take one period to become productive.
Fixed capital cannot be disinvested unless the ¯rm is liquidated, while variable capital is
reversible. Because of an enforceability problem, the ¯rm can obtain external ¯nancing
only if it secures it with collateral. The only collateral accepted by the lendersis the phys-
ical capital used in the production. This implies that the ¯rm needs some downpayment
to ¯nance investment, and that its borrowing capacity depends on its ¯nancial wealth.
We determine the conditions under which, because of the uncertainty about productivity,
the ¯rm has a positive probability of facing ¯nancing constraints in equilibrium.
Since variable capital investment isreversible, thenthe "premium" of expectedmarginal
productivity over user cost of variable capital re°ects the tightness of current and future
expected ¯nancing constraints. More speci¯cally the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis im-
plies that this premium is monotonously decreasing in the ¯nancial wealth of the ¯rms,
conditional on their ¯xed capital stock and their productivity shock. This test has two
important properties: our structural model directly relates the value of the premium to
the intensity ¯nancing constraints3. Therefore it is robust to the Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) critique. Moreover the test maintains its power of discriminating the ¯nancing
constraints hypothesis from the perfect markets hypothesis in the presence of two poten-
tial misspeci¯cation problems: the presence of adjustment costs in investment and the
misspeci¯cation of the stochastic process for the productivity shock. We argue that this
is because in the presence of these two problems the test is biased towards "rejecting
the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis when it is true" rather than "accepting it when it is
false".
We test the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis by estimating empirical measures of the
3Indeed such indicatorcan be consistent with other models of investment with ¯nancing imperfections.
for example a similar procedure has been suggested also by Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2000): "... the
theory predicts that short run ¯nancing constraints can only be identi¯ed by estimating the process for
excess marginal return to production".
3productivity shocks and of the expected marginal productivity of variable capital for a
sample of 561 small and medium Italian manufacturing ¯rms from Mediocredito Centrale.
We use the informationfrom 11 yearsof balance sheet data, from 1982to1992, to estimate
the indicator of the intensity of ¯nancing constraints for each ¯rm-year observation. A
unique feature of this sample is the availability, for the same ¯rms, of a rich survey with
qualitative information about their ¯nancial decisions and especially about the ¯nancing
problems they faced in funding investment in the 1989-1991 period. This information is
used to perform an independent robustness check which strongly supports the validity
of our estimated indicator of the intensity of ¯nancing constraints: ¯rms with an high
value of the indicator are three times more likely to state ¯nancing problems in funding
investment than ¯rms with a low value. We then use the estimated indicator to verify
the prediction of the model, and we show that the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis is not
rejected for all the ¯rms in the sample but the larger ones.
This paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the model; section 3 de¯nes
the ¯nancing constraints test and the estimation strategy, showing the results of the
production function estimation; section 4 veri¯es the validity of our indicator of the
intensity of ¯nancing constraints using the qualitative data from Mediocredito Centrale;
section 5 tests the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis; section 6 summarises the conclusions.
2 The model
The aim of this section is to provide a theoretical framework that supports the ¯nancing
constraints test performed in the remaining sections of the paper. We will analyse a
model of ¯rm investment based on chapter 4 in Caggese (2002). We consider a risk
neutral manager of a ¯rm which has the objective to maximise the discounted sum of
future expected dividends. The discount factor is equal to 1=R; where R = 1 + r; and
r is the lending/borrowing risk free interest rate. In an environment with limited access
to external funds these assumptions imply that the ¯rm never distributes dividends and
retains earnings in the form of ¯nancial assets until there is even the smallest chance
of facing future ¯nancing constraints. Therefore in order to allow for the presence of
4¯nancially constrained ¯rms in equilibrium, we include the following assumption
4:
Assumption 1: A ¯xed share of output ´ > 0 is nontradable, and cannot be rein-
vested in the activity, but only distributed as dividend:
dt = d
¤
t + ´yt (1)
d
¤
t ¸ 0 (2)
We de¯ne (1 + ´)yt as total output. This is composed by ´yt; the nontradable output,
and yt; which is "¯nancial" output that can be distributed as ¯nancial dividend d
¤
tor
reinvested in the ¯rm. dt is total dividends. ´yt can be interpreted as private bene¯ts
accruing to the shareholders of the ¯rm. Its presence implies that the ¯rm behaves like
an empire builder a la Jensen (1986). If the ¯rm has free cash °ow available it invests
in projects which are ine±cient in ¯nancial terms, in order to increase output and the
share of nontradable output. This overinvestment is counterbalanced by the presence of
¯nancing constraints. When ¯nancial wealth is low, future expected ¯nancing constraints
induce the ¯rm to downsize investment in order toincrease ¯nancial pro¯ts. This increases
cash °ow, reduces future expected ¯nancing constraints and induces the ¯rm to expand
activity again. Thus the ¯rm never accumulates so much ¯nancial wealth to become
unconstrained forever. Finally, we assume that the expected lifetime of the ¯rm is ¯nite.
We consider a parameter °; arbitrarily close to 1, such that each period with probability
1¡° the ¯rm's technology becomes useless. In this case the ¯rm is liquidated5.
Regarding the technology, the ¯rm operates with two inputs, kt and lt, which are
respectively ¯xed and variable capital, installed at or before time t¡1; which will generate
output at time t: Variable capital represents variable inputs such as materials and work
in progress, while ¯xed capital represents ¯xed inputs such as plant and equipment. The





t with ® +¯ < 1 (3)
4Caggese (2003) shows that a similar result is obtained in the context of a ¯rm owned and managed
by a risk averse entrepreneur who discounts future at a rate higher than the market interest rate.
5This assumption in conjunction of assumption 1 is necessary to allow for the presence of ¯nancing
constraints in equilibrium. See Caggese (2002) for details
5All prices are assumed constant and normalised
6 to 1. µt is a productivity shock that
follows a ¯rst order stationary autoregressive stochastic process:







The di®erence betweenthe inputsisthat variable capital is nondurable, while ¯xedcapital
is durable:
1 = ±l > ±k (5)
±l and±k are the depreciationfactorsofvariable and¯xed capital respectively. Variable
capital is reversible, while ¯xed capital is irreversible, and can only be disinvested if
the whole ¯rm is sold. Therefore conditional on continuation the ¯rm is subject to the
following constraints:
kt+1 ¸ (1 ¡±k)kt (6)
Irreversibility of ¯xed capital is justi¯ed by the fact that plant and equipment usually do
not have a secondary market because theycannot be easily convertedtoother productions.
Yet we allow ¯xed capital to be used as collateral by assuming that such conversion is
easier if the whole of the assets is sold. The assumption that ¯xed capital is irreversible
conditional on continuation is consistent with the empirical evidence on a very large
sample of US manufacturing plants analysed by Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995).
Financial imperfections are introduced by assuming that new shares issues and risky
debt are not available. At time t the ¯rm can borrow from (and lend to) the banks
one period debt, with face value bt+1; at the market riskless interest rate r: A positive
(negative) bt+1 indicates that the ¯rm is a net borrower (lender). Banks only lend secured
debt, and the only collateral they accept is the next period residual value of physical
capital. Therefore at time t the amount of borrowingislimitedby the followingconstraint:
bt+1 · ¿kkt+1 (7)
¿k · (1¡±k) (8)
6This simplifying assumption will obviously be relaxed in the next section.
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¿k is the share of ¯xed capital value that can be used as collateral
7. From equation (5) it
follows8 that ¿l = 0. The rationale for constraint (7) is that the ¯rm can hide the revenues
from the production. Being unable to observe such revenues the lenders can only claim,
as repayment of the debt, the value of the ¯rm's physical assets (Hart and Moore, 1998).
Therefore the ¯rm can only lend or borrow one period secured debt at the market interest
rate r o®ered by the banks.
The presence of irreversibility of ¯xed capital and of ¯nancing constraints implies that
in some situations the ¯rm may be forced to be liquidated to repay the debt. If revenues
allow the ¯rm to repay the debt and to continue, it may still be optimal to liquidate it if
expected short term return is so low as to o®set long term gains from continuing activity.
Although the interactions between ¯nancing constraints and entry-exit dynamics of ¯rms
is an interesting topic to explore in future research9, it goes beyond the scope of this
paper. Hence we restrict the parameter space to the values such that forced or voluntary
exit never happens in equilibrium10. The timing of the model is illustrated in ¯gure 1. At
the beginning of period t the ¯rm inherits from time t¡1 the stocks of ¯xed and variable
capital kt and lt. Then µt is realised, (1+ ´)yt is produced and bt repaid. Residual wealth
7¿k < 1¡±k implies that the¯rm can 'steal' a 1¡¿k fraction of the residual valueof capital (1¡±k)kt.
8This assumption is not essential. The results would hold if we instead assumed that variable capital
can be collateralisable, as long as some downpayment is needed to ¯nance investment.
9Caggese (2003) analyses how the interactions between irreversibility and ¯nancing constraints are
useful in explaining several stylised facts about investment dynamics
10See Caggese (2002), chapter 4 and appendix 1 for details. This restriction does not change the
implications of the model for the test of the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis, it is only included to make
the model's analysis easier.
7wt; net of non tradable output ´yt is the following:
wt = yt + (1¡±k)kt ¡bt (9)
After producing the ¯rm is liquidated with probability °: Conditional of continuation the
¯rm borrows new one period debt and allocates the net wealth plus the new borrowing
between dividends, investment in ¯xed capital and investment in variable capital. The
problem is interesting for the values of ´ high enough so that the ¯rm never accumulates
enough¯nancial resources to eliminate the probability toface future ¯nancingconstraints.
It is possible to prove the following:
Proposition 1 if ´ ¸ ´min then an active ¯rm has always some probability of facing
future ¯nancing constraints and never distributes ¯nancial dividends, i.e. dt = ´yt and
d¤
t = 0 for t = 0; 1; :::; 1:
Proof: see Caggese11 2002.
Proposition 1 implies that conditional on continuation ¯nancial dividends are always
zero. Hence the ¯rm is subject to the following budget constraint:
lt+1 + kt+1 = wt +bt+1=R (10)
Let's denote the value at time t of an active ¯rm, after µt is realised, by Wt (wt; µt; kt) :
Wt (wt; µt; kt) = ´yt+ MAX 0
B @
kt+1+j = k(wt;µt; kt)
lt+1+j = l(wt; µt; kt)















The ¯rm maximization problem is now de¯ned by (11) subject to (6), (7) and (10).
These constraints de¯ne a compact and convex feasibility set for lt+1, kt+1 and bt+1;
and the law of motion of wt+1 conditional on wt; kt and µt is continuous. Therefore,
given the assumptions on µt and the concavity of the production function, a solution
11Caggese (2002) shows that, for a large range of reasonable parameter space, ´min is aroud 15%-20%.
8to the problem exists and is unique
12. In order to describe the optimality conditions
of the model, let ¹t; ¸t and Át be the Lagrangian multipliers associated respectively to
constraints (6); (7) and (10). Taking the ¯rst order conditions of (11) with respect to bt+1;
lt+1 and kt+1 it is possible to show that the solution is given by the optimal sequence of
fbt+1; kt+1; lt+1; ¸t; ¹t; Át j kt;wt; µt;£g
1
t=1 that satis¯es (6), (12), (13), (14) and (15) plus
the standard Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions on ¸t and ¹t:










(1+´)Et (MPLt+1) = UL+ R
2¸t +Et (-l;t+1) (14)
(1 +´)Et (MPKt+1) = UK + DR





D = 1¡ ¿k=R is the downpayment required to purchase one additional unit of ¯xed
capital. Equation (12) combines together the budget constraint (10) and the collateral
constraint (7) and implies that the downpayment necessary to buy kt+1 and lt+1 must
be lower than the ¯rm's net worth. Equation (13) is obtained by solving recursively
forward the ¯rst order condition for bt+1: Equations (14) and (15) are obtained using
the ¯rst order condition for bt+1 to substitute Át in the ¯rst order conditions for kt+1
and lt+1: UL ´ R and UK ´ R ¡ (1 ¡ ±k) are the user cost of variable and ¯xed
capital respectively. Et (MPLt+1) ´ ¯Et (µt+1)k®
t+1l
¯¡1
t+1 is the marginal productivity of




t+1 is the marginal productivity of
¯xed capital. Et (-k;t+1) and Et (-l;t+1) are the premiums in the return of ¯xed and
variable capital respectively. They are required by the ¯rm to compensate for the cost of
future expected ¯nancing constraints, and are de¯ned as follows:






for z 2 fk; lg (16)
¸t is positive when the collateral constraint (7) is binding, and is equal to zero other-
wise. It represents the shadow cost of not being able to increase investment because of the
12See Stokey and Lucas (1989), Chapter 9.2.




is the cost of future expected irreversibility
problems. ¹t is positive when the irreversibility constraint (6) is binding, and is equal to
zero otherwise.
Inthismodel the interactionsbetweenirreversibilityand¯nancingconstraintsgenerate
a rich set of implications for the behaviour of ¯rm investment in the business cycle. These
are discussed in Caggese (2002) and Caggese (2003). In this paper we focus on the
intensity of ¯nancing constraints. The method used is illustrated in the following section.
3 A new test of ¯nancing constraints on ¯rm invest-
ment
Equation (14), shows that the marginal productivity is equal to the marginal cost of
variable capital. The marginal cost can be divided into three components: UL is the user
cost of purchasing one additional unit ofvariable capital. Without ¯nancing imperfections
thiswouldbe the only relevant cost. ¸t isthe shadowcost ofabinding¯nancingconstraint.
It is positive when equation (12) is binding with equality, meaning that all available
resources are invested in lt+1 and kt+1 , but there are still some pro¯table investment
opportunities.
Et (-l;t+1) is the cost of future expected ¯nancing constraints. Equation (16) shows
that it is the product between the value of money in terms of its ability to reduce future
expected ¯nancing problems
13, Át+1 ¡1; multiplied by the loss in monetary pro¯t caused
by the overinvestment problem, UK ¡MPKt+1: Et (-t+1) is equal to zero if there are no
expected ¯nancing constraints and Át = 1 for t = 0;1; :::; 1. Otherwise it is positive and
measures the opportunity value of reducing investment in the risky technology to increase
¯nancial earnings and to reduce future ¯nancing constraints. We now rewrite equation
(14) adding the subscript i for the i-th ¯rm:
Et (ªi;t+1) = (1+ ´)Et (MPLi;t+1) ¡ULi;t (17)






: If there are
no future expected ¯nancing constraints then ¸t+1 = 0 for any t and Át+1 = 1: Otherwise Át+1 ¡ 1 is
monotonously increasing in the cost of future expected ¯nancing constraints.
10Where Et (ªi;t+1) is de¯ned as follows:
Et (ªi;t+1) ´ Et (-l;i;t+1) + R
2¸i;t (18)
Et (ªi;t+1) is the premium in the expected marginal productivity of variable capital in-
duced either by the cost of current ¯nancing constraint ¸i;t; or by the cost of future
expected ¯nancing constraints Et (-i;t+1). It is possible to state the following proposition:




0 < Et (ªi;t+1) < 1
(ii) lim
wt!wMAX Et (ªi;t+1) = 0
(iii)
@Et (ªt+1 j µt;kt)
@wt
jwt·wMAX< 0
Proof: see Caggese (2002)
Proposition 2 states that Et (ªi;t+1) is a monotonously decreasing function of ¯nancial
wealth, conditional on µi;t and ki;t. Moreover it implies that the higher is Et (ªi;t+1); the
higher are current and future expected ¯nancing constraints. Therefore Et (ªi;t+1) repre-
sents an indicator of the intensity of ¯nancing constraints which is theoretically consistent
and robust to the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) critique. This property depends crucially
on the fact that variable capital is reversible, and hence it can be reduced proportion-
ally to the intensity of current and future expected ¯nancing constraints. For the same
reason ¯xed capital does not satisfy the same property, because of the presence of the
irreversibility constraint. Thus we formulate the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis in the
following way:
H0) if ¯rms are subject, now or in the future, to ¯nancing constraints, then we expect
a monotonously decreasing relationship between Et (ªi;t+1) and wi;t; conditional on µi;t
and ki;t:
H1) If ¯nancing constraints are irrelevant then we expect no systematic relationship
between Et (ªi;t+1) and wi;t; conditional on µi;t and ki;t:
An important property of this test is that it is robust to two potential misspeci¯cation
problems that could a®ect our estimation of the empirical counterparts of Et (ªi;t+1) and
11µi;t: the misspeci¯cation of the stochastic process for the productivity shock and the
presence of adjustment costs in variable capital. Since we allow only for a persistent
source of uncertainty, we implicitly assume that any positive productivity shock which
increases µi;t also increases Et (µt+1) and investment. But if a shock in µi;t is transitory,
and does not a®ect Et (µt+1); then it should not a®ect the investment in variable capital
lt+1 of unconstrained ¯rms. Conversely if there are adjustment costs in variable capital,
it is possible that positive persistent productivity shocks increase µi;t and Et (µt+1), but
do not also immediately increase investment in variable capital lt+1.
In both cases these shocks would increase the excess marginal productivity of variable
capital, because Et (ªi;t+1) increases in µt; for a given level of investment. But such high
value of Et (ªi;t+1) would not be related to ¯nancing constraints. However it would also
be accompanied by positive cash °ow and by an increase in net worth wi;t at time t:
Therefore if this problem is very severe we would observe that the value of Et (ªi;t+1) is
increasing rather than decreasing in wi;t. This means that such misspeci¯cation problems
are likely to bias our test toward rejecting the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis when it is
true, rather than the opposite.
In the next section after estimating the empirical counterpart of Et (ªi;t+1); called
t b ªi;t+1; we ¯rst con¯rm its validity as a ¯nancing constraints indicator using the direct
qualitative information about ¯nancing problems available for our sample of ¯rms. Then
we test the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis H0: we discretise the steady space of µi;t and
ki;t and we perform, conditional on these variables, a nonparametric regression of t b ªi;t+1on
wi;t: If ¯nancing constraints are irrelevant we expect no systematic negative relation, at
¯rm level, between wi;t and Et (ªi;t+1 j µi;t; ki;t) and H0 should be rejected by the data.
Although this nonparametric approach su®ers from a dimensionality problem, we be-
lieve that this strategy is feasible because we can discretise µi;t and ki;t in a small number
of intervals. This is because wi;t is the only variable that directly a®ects Et (ªi;t+1) by
determining the probability of present and future expected ¯nancing constraints. If wi;t
is low, then Et (ªi;t+1) is expected to be positive, regardless of µi;t being low or high,
unless the persistency of µi;t is very high. Since the estimated persistency of µi;t is quite
12low (see ¯gure 5 in section 4), we can condition with respect to µi;t by discretising for





> 0; and/or ¹i;t > 0: In this case the ratio
ki;t
li;t increases and this ampli¯es the
sensitivity14 of Et (ªi;t+1) with respect to wi;t. This e®ect disappears when ki;t is low, so









> 0 and/or ¹i;t > 0 by focusing on ¯rm year observations with relatively
smaller ¯xed capital/variable capital ratios:
4 Estimation strategy
In order to test the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis we need empirical estimates of the
expected marginal productivity of variable capital Et (MPLi;t+1) and of the user cost of










with ® > 0; ¯ > 0; ° > 0 and ®+ ¯ + ° < 1: With respect to the theoretical section,
we maintain the decreasing return to scale Cobb-Douglas production function, but we
include labour (Ni;t): The inclusion of an additional factor of production does not modify
the theoretical results showed in the previous section15. c is the constant common to
the whole sample. Ai includes all assets that are ¯xed in the time period used for the




"t is an exogenous market wide shock, Âs;t is an exogenous sector speci¯c shock, and µ
f
i;t
is a ¯rm speci¯c idiosyncratic shock. The subscript s refers to the s-th industrial sector.
Followingthe speci¯cationofthe theoretical model, lnµ
f
i;t isa ¯rst order stochastic process:
14See Caggese (2002), chapter 4 for details.
15Labour could in principle be considered an additional variable factor of production, and hence used
to test the ¯nancing constraint hypothesis in conjunction with variable capital. We prefer instead to
focus only on variable capital because of the characteristics of the data we use for the estimation. During
the sample period Italian ¯rms were unable to freely reduce employment, and therefore labour was closer
to an irreversible than to a reversible factor of production.
16One way to interpret this term is to de¯ne it as Ai ´ E
1¡®¡¯¡°
i ; where Ei is the quality of the





i;t + Ài;t with Ài;t » iid(0;¾
2
À) and ½ ¸ 0 : Hence lnµi;t+1 can be either
serially correlated (½ > 0 ) or i.i.d. (½ = 0).
We know that, under some regularity conditions, ®, ¯ and ° can be estimated as the
factors shares of output: b ¯ =
ULtlt+1
yt+1 ; and b ® =
UKtkt+1
yt+1 . This requires that for each factor
of production expected marginal productivity equals the user cost. This is not true in
our model, because the user cost of capital does not include the cost of ¯nancing and
irreversibility constraints. It is in fact possible to show that in our case b ®; b ¯ and b ° would

















UL +R2¸t ¡cov(MPLt+1; Át+1)
6= ¯ (21)
Therefore we choose to directly estimate the parameters of the production function, using
an instrumental variable estimation technique.
5 Estimation results
We estimate equation (19) using the following data: p
y
tY T
i;t is total revenues in monetary
terms. pk
t Ki;t is the replacement value of plant, equipment and other intangible ¯xed
assets. pl
tLi;t is the nominal value of working capital. pn
t Ni;t is labour cost. Detailed
information about these variables is provided in appendix 1. Given that land and building
are not included elsewhere in the production function, Ai also proxies for the size of these
assets





t ; and we rede¯ne p
y
1Y T
i;t = yi;t and pz
1Zi;t = zi;t; with z 2 fk; l; ng:Variables
y; k;l and n are therefore valued at constant 1982 prices. Figure 2 reports summary
statistics of yi;t; ki;t; li;t and ni;t.
17This formulation is correct only if the stock of land and building is constant during the time period
used for the estimation (11 years). Although this is true for some ¯rms in the sample, it is obviously
not always the case. Nonetheless we prefer this formulation because balance sheet data do not provide
a reliable valuation of the replacement value of land and building. In fact almost all the items in the
balance sheets are valued at historic costs, and due to the occasional nature of the investment in land
and building we cannot use the perpetual inventory method. We hope that any variation in such assets
will be absorbed by a similar variation in Ki;t.
14Figure 2: Summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the production function
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max
yi,t 33.105 68.002 1.095 1162.078
li,t 19.582 51.121 0.093 1200.405
ni,t 11.303 19.475 0.343 235.296
ki,t 8.179 18.454 0.067 259.543
Values are in billions of Italian liras, 1982 prices. 1 billion liras was equal to 0.71 million US$ at the 1982
exchange rate
By taking logs, we have the following linearised version
18 of equation (19):
lnyi;t = c + lnAi +ln"t + lnÂs;t +® lnki;t + ¯ lnli;t + ° lnni;t +lnµ
f
i;t (22)
In order to allow some heterogeneity in the technology employed by ¯rms in di®erent
sectors, equation (22) is separately estimated for seven groups of ¯rms. Each group is
composed of ¯rms with as homogeneous as possible production activities. Figure 3 shows
Figure 3: Composition of the selected groups
Groups composition
Two Digits (ISTAT*) Sectors Num Two Digits (ISTAT*) Sectors Num
Group 1: Industrial machinery 78 Group 5: Metallic products 80
Group 2: Electronic Machinery, Precision instruments 49 Group 6: Food, Sugar and Tobaccos, Paper and Printing 66
Group 3: Textiles, Shoes and Clothes, Wood furniture 117 Group 7: Non-metallic minerals, Other manufacturing 108
Group 4: Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 63
* Italian National Statistic Institute
their composition. Equation (22) is estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments
(GMM)19. A discussion of the speci¯cation tests adopted to select the estimation method
are present in Appendix 2. Figure 4 illustrates the estimation results. The ¯rst column is
relative to the whole sample, while the next seven columns show estimates of b ®, b ¯ and b °
for the seven groups separately. The Wald test shows that the restriction b ® + b ¯ + b ° = 1
is rejected in favour of b ® + b ¯ + b ° < 1 for all groups except group 7. Since this assumption
is necessary to derive the ¯nancing constraint hypothesis to be tested, we exclude the
observations in group 7 from the empirical estimation of t b ª
w
i;t+1.
The estimated output elasticity of variable capital b ¯ ranges between 0.29 and 0.56,
and in three groups is higher than the output elasticity of labour b °. These high estimates






t is going to be absorbed
by the dummies "t and Âs;t and by the ¯rm speci¯c shock µ
f
i;t:
19Such method is used for a similar problem by Hall and Mairesse (1996).
15Figure 4: Production function estimation results
Estimated coefficients of the production function 
  All Firms  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 5  Group 6  Group 7 
??


















































Test of overid. restr.  65.50  38.90  25.78  39.87  39.71  38.20  45.18  33.64 
Degrees of freedom  37  37  27




p-value  0.00  0.38  0.53  0.34  0.35  0.37  0.14  0.58 
Chi square4    29.7  41.7  814.6  217.2  9.61  11.35  0.01 
p-value    0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.91 
n. firms  561  78  49  117  63  80  66  108 
n. of observations  4488  624  392  936  504  640  528  864 
1) Standard deviation in parenthesis; 2) One coefficient relative to a two-digit sector dummy variable is estimated here; 
3) Only 6 years of lagged instruments used for the estimation of this group, due to the reduced number of observations; 
4) Wald test of the following restriction: ??????? 
of ¯ are quite common in ¯rm-level estimates of the production function (see for example
Hall and Mairesse, 1996). Output elasticity of ¯xed capital b ® ranges between20 0.04 and
0.11. The overidentifying restrictions are rejected for the estimation of the whole sample,
but not for single groups estimations.
Before proceeding to estimate Et (MPLi;t+1), the expected marginal productivity of
variable capital, it is important to mention a problem which could have a®ected the
estimates obtained above. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that weak instruments can
cause large ¯nite sample biases when performing GMM estimation on data transformed
using ¯rst di®erencing. The same problem can a®ect the GMM estimates on the data
transformed using the forward orthogonal transformation method, which is equivalent
to ¯rst di®erencing when all moment conditions are used (Arellano and Bover, 1995).
Indeed Blundell and Bond (2000) show that these biases are the likely reason why the
¯xed capital coe±cient in the production function, estimated using GMM on the ¯rst
di®erenced equations, is not signi¯cant (and even negative in some speci¯cations) both in
Hall and Mairesse (1996) and in their paper. Blundell and Bond (2000) propose a more
e±cient "System GMM" estimation method that includes lagged ¯rst di®erence of the
20This range of values is reasonable and consistent with the factor shares of output, given the amount
of ¯xed capital as opposed to variable capital used in the production (see ¯gure 2), and the di®erence
in the user costs of ¯xed and variable capital generated by the di®erence in depreciation factors (see
appendix 1).
16seriesasinstruments for the level equations. Even thoughthisproblem could have a®ected
the precision of our estimates, it is important to note that our estimated coe±cients of
the production function do not exhibit a downward bias the same size as the one of the
estimates of Hall and Mairesse (1996). In fact we estimate a positive and signi¯cant ¯xed
capital coe±cient, with a magnitude consistent with the factor shares, as argued above
21.
In order to obtain an empirical estimate of Et (MPLi;t+1); we ¯rst use the estimates b ®;
b ¯ and b ° to compute the total factor productivity for all the yearsfrom '82to '92: d TFT i;t =
lny¡ b ® lnki;t + b ¯ lnli;t ¡b °lnni;t: Where d TFT i;t ´ lnc+lnAi+ln"t+lnÂs;t +lnµ
f
i;t: Then
we perform a panel data regression with ¯xed e®ects, year and sector dummy variables, to
estimate ln b c; ln b Ai; ln b Âs;t and lnb "t. The estimated residual from thisregression is b µ
f
i;t; and
we use it to estimate the autocorrelation coe±cient b b ½22 separately for the seven groups
of ¯rms, as shown in ¯gure 5.The b b ½ estimates are positive and signi¯cant, but relatively
Figure 5: Autocorrelation coe±cient estimation results
Estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient of the firm specific productivity shock















Test of overid. restr. 1.599 1.67 1.60 1.59 1.59 1.61 1.60
Degrees of freedom 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
p-value 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.66
n. of observations 390 305 585 315 400 330 480
? ~ 0.22 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.25 0.35 0.32
*Alternative estimator of ? based on the estimated transition probabilities of ? i,t discretised in a two states
transition matrix.
low, ranging from 0:33 to 0:36: These values are broadly consistent with an alternative
estimator e ½ simply based on the transition probabilities of b µ
f
i;t discretised in a two states
transition matrix. Using (19) we de¯ne the expected marginal productivity of variable
capital as follows:


















As we mentioned before, the term Ai absorbs between-¯rm di®erences in µ
f
i;t: Given that
Yi;t is decreasing return to scale in Ki;t, Li;t and Ni;t, Ai mainly represents permanent
21See footnote n.20
22We compute d TFT
0
i;t = d TFTi;t ¡ ln b Âs;t ¡b "t , we apply to it the same forward orthogonal transfor-





to t ¡5 lags as instruments.
17dimensional di®erences between ¯rms. Hence, in order to compare marginal productivity


































= 0: Hence our estimator of
Et (MPLt+1)
W ; called t d MPL
W
t+1; is the following:
d MPL
w











where tb µi;t+1 ´ e
b b ½ lnb µ
f
i;tb "tb Âs;t
In order to derive (25) from (24) we implicitly assume that investment is planned
one period in advance. Therefore ki;t+1, li;t+1 and ni;t+1 are predetermined at time t.
Regarding the shock, e
b b ½ lnb µ
f







; while Et("t+1) and Et(Âs;t+1)
are simply approximated by the estimated ¯xed e®ects b "t and b Âs;t: The user cost of capital

















tULi;t: Furthermore ±l = 1 by construction, because both in the model and in the
empirical application we include in li;t+1 only variable capital consumed during time t+1
in order to produce time t + 1 output (see appendix 1 for details). Hence the user cost
simpli¯es to:
uli;t = 1 +rt (27)
where rt is the real interest rate at time t; measured as the nominal riskless short term
interest rate (average nominal interest rate, during period t of the three months treasury
bills) minus in°ation rate (change in the consumer price index between the fourth quarter
23This assumption is not likely to cause a relevant bias in the estimates of Et (MPLi;t+1)
W ; because









is quite low. It ranges
from a minimum of 0.05%, for ¯rms in group 6, to a maximum of 4.83%, for ¯rms in group 3.
24Since b µ
f
i;t is relatively close to 0, then e
b b ½ lnb µ
f





18ofperiod t¡1and the fourthquarter ofperiod t). In order touse (27) as the equation that
de¯nes the user cost of variable capital, we adopt a series of simplifying assumptions25.
Moreover we maintain the assumption made in the theoretical section that ¯rms only
borrow riskless debt. This implies that the user cost of capital is independent on the risk
faced by the ¯rms' projects. In reality some ¯rms also borrow risky debt, and their user
cost of capital should include a component above the riskless interest rate representing
the price of risk. We believe that, even though the inclusion of such risk premium may
be relevant, its omission would not substantially a®ect our ¯ndings. This is because the
magnitude of the cost of ¯nancing constraints predicted by the model, and con¯rmed by
the estimations in the next section, is much larger than the likely size of a risk premium
component. Therefore the bias in the estimation of Et (ªi;t+1) caused by the omission of
the risk premium component is likely to be small.
Given (27), the estimated ¯nancing constraints indicator Et (ªi;t+1)
























Hence t b ªw
i;t+1 is biased downwards by the unobservable parameter ´. In the theoretical
model we assume such parameter to be constant across ¯rms. We interpret it as private
(non ¯nancial) bene¯ts accruing to the owners of the ¯rm. Even if the value of ´ is
25This formulation is considerably simpli¯ed by the fact that we do not formally treat taxes. If we
allow for taxation di®erentials, then ULi;t would be multiplied by one minus a term that represents the
expected tax bene¯t of one additional unit of investment at time t. Such tax bene¯t is mainly given
by the "debt tax shield", because tax credits are usually associated with ¯xed capital investment. An
explicit treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, also because we do not have accurate
information on the incidence of tax exhaustion in order to measure the e®ective tax parameters facing
individual ¯rms. Even though we agree that tax di®erentials play a relevant role in determining Italian
¯rms' capital structure, we follow Bond and Meghir (1994) in assuming that °uctuations in the user cost
of capital due to tax distortions are mainly absorbed by ¯rm and year speci¯c e®ects, captured by Ai
and "t: All of the results presented in the following part of the paper are based on deviations from ¯rm
averages that are independent on Ai; while the exclusion of "t does not a®ect the results in any relevant
way.
26The estimator of Et (ªi;t+1)
W does not include ¯xed e®ects Ai as well. Since by construction
N P
i=1
ln b Ai = 0, and since the exponential is a convex function, it follows that
N P
i=1







i;t+1 is expected to slightly underestimate Et (ªi;t+1): This bias is expected to be small, and in
any case it is constant at ¯rm level.
19Figure 6: Summary statistics for the estimated excess expected marginal productivity of
variable capital ( t b ªw
i;t+1)
Mean  St. dev.  Min.  Max. 
0.026  0.727  -1.05  3.013 
 
non constant but rather a function of unobservable characteristics of the ¯rm's owners,
and such characteristics are randomly distributed across the sample, then this distortion
should not a®ect the results27. Figures 6 and 7 show basic statistics28 and the kernel
estimation of the distribution function of t b ªw
i;t+1 . Figure 7 shows that t b ªw
i;t+1has an
asymmetric distribution with a thicker tail corresponding to higher than average values.
The ¯nancing constraint hypothesis implies that these are ¯rm-year observations where,
because of ¯nancing constraints, the ¯rm could not increase variable capital to exploit
pro¯table investment opportunities. We verify this hypothesis in the next two sections.
5.1 Empirical evidence of ¯nancing constraints on investment
Before testing the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis, we verify the validity of t b ªw
i;t+1 as an
estimate of the intensity of ¯nancing constraints. We use the direct information about
¯nancing problems available in the Mediocredito Centrale survey. In the survey ¯rms
were asked whether they had any of the following problems regarding the ¯nancing of new
investment projects in the 1989-91 period: Q1) lack of collateral; Q2) lack of medium-long
term ¯nancing; Q3) too high cost of banking debt. Such problems are directly related to
the value of the variable tb ªw
i;t+1 . The bigger is t b ªw
i;t+1; the higher is the shadow value of
additional fundingfor the i-th ¯rm andthe higher the probabilitythat it answerspositively
to one of the questions regarding ¯nancing constraints. Among the 561 ¯rms considered,
27Another possibility is to assume that ´ is a decreasing function of the size of the ¯rm. For example in
a recent paper Hamilton (2000) shows that high levels of private (non ¯nancial) bene¯ts for self employed
entrepreneurs are needed to explain the estimated earning di®erential between self employment and paid
employment, and self employed entrepreneur are more likely to maange smaller businesses. If this is the
case, then we expect this bias not to signi¯cantly distort our estimation results, because we control for
¯rm's size in all the following analysis,
28This is ¯ltered from outliers. We ¯rst exclude observations that deviate from the mean by more
than 8 times the standard deviation, then recompute the mean and exclude all observations that deviate
more than 4 times from the standard deviation: Out of the initial 4821 observations, we eliminate 51
observations for c tª
w
i;t+1.











-1.15 -0.46 0.22 0.91 1.59 2.27 2.96
Kernel density estimation of t? t+1
w (bandwidth=0.1) 
21.2% of them indicate one of the three problems in accessing bank credit during the
1989-1991 period. We construct 4 dichotomous variables, ration
j
i with j = f1; 2; 3; 4g;
that have value 0 if the i ¡ th ¯rm does not state any ¯nancing problem, 1 if it answers
positively to questions Q1, Q2 and Q3 (respectively j = 1;2 and 3) or states any of the
three problems (j = 4). We verify the reliability of t b ªw
i;t+1 as a valid indicator of the
intensity of ¯nancing constraints by estimating the following equation:
ration
j
i = ®0 + ®1ª
w
i + ®2 dimi (30)
ª
w
i is the average value of t b ªw










. The time interval used to compute ª
w
i includes 1989, 1990
and 1991, the period which the questions refer to, and 1992, the year in which the ques-
tionnaire has been compiled. dimi is the size of the i ¡th ¯rm in number of employees,
and is included to control for size e®ects. Figure 8 shows estimation results. The ¯rst
column is relative to the whole sample and to ration4
i as dependent variable. The coe±-
cient relative to ª
w
i ; ®1; is positive and signi¯cant. The second and third columns repeat
the same regression for larger (more than 300 employees, 19% of the sample) and smaller
(less than 300 employees, 81% of the sample) ¯rms. The cutting point between small and




















































































Total obs 433 81 352 352 352 352
Standard error in parenthesis; 1: More than 300 employees; 2: Less than 300 employees; * Significant at 90% confidence level;
** significant at 95% confidence level; *** significant at 99% confidence level; rationi = 1 if the entrepreneur stated financing
constraints, and 0 otherwise;??
w
i
 = average value of the premium in the expected productivity of variable capital; dimi =
dimension in number of employees;
large ¯rms is suggested by ¯gure 9, which shows the tri-dimensional smoothing of ration4
with respect to both ª
w
i and dimi. Figure 9 shows that the positive correlation between
the probability of stating ¯nancing problems and ª
w
i is strong for all the ¯rms except the
larger ones, so that on average "small-medium" ¯rms with a high value of ª
w
i are three
times more likely to declare ¯nancing constraints than ¯rms with a low value of ª
w
i . Such
relation tends to disappear for ¯rms bigger than 250-300 employees.
In order to interpret this result, we note that inour estimation the assumption that µ
f
i;t
is stationary, plus the condition that ®+¯ +° < 1; imply that we assume di®erent steady
states sizes for di®erent ¯rms, according to their ¯xed e®ects Ai: Each ¯rm evolves around
itssteady state dependingonthe realisations29 of the idiosyncratic shockµ
f
i;t: Therefore the
result illustrated in ¯gures 8 and 9 is consistent with the assumption that the higher the
average size of a ¯rm, the less likely it is to face the informational or contractual problem
which cause the ¯nancing constraint (7) to be binding. This ¯nding is not surprising,
because large Italian ¯rms usually have strong links with ¯nancial intermediaries, and
the assumption that they have access only to fully collateralised credit is not realistic for
them.




i for small and medium ¯rms below 300
29This stationarity assumption is reasonable in this context, given that the time series is 11 years only.
22Figure 9: Probability of stating ¯nancing problems as a function of size and ¯nancing
constraints indicator
23Figure 10: Sectorial distribution of ¯nancing constraints
Industrial sectors and financing problems  
Sector  N firms  % with financing 
problems 
% without financing 
problems 
Whole sample  897  23  77 
Mechanic materials and 
machineries 
139  21.6  78.4 
Metallic products  130  26.9  73.1 
Textiles  87  21.8  78.2 
Shoes and clothes  65  10.8  89.2 
Electric and electronic 
materials 
60  28.3  71.7 
Paper, printing and publishing  57  33.3  66.7 
Non metallic minerals  56  21.4  78.6 
Other manufacturing   53  28.3  71.7 
Wood and wooden furniture  50  22  78 
Rubber and plastic  50  22  78 
 
employees is con¯rmed in the last four columns of ¯gure 8: the ª
w
i coe±cient is positive
and strongly signi¯cant, especially for the speci¯cation (j = 4) that pools together the
three di®erent questions. This ¯nding demonstrates that t b ªw
i;t+1 is a valid indicator of
the intensity of ¯nancing constraints, and supports the validity of our theoretical model
and our empirical approach. Moreover this ¯nding is robust because of at least three
reasons: ¯rst, the qualitative and quantitative information come from di®erent sources.
This reduces the probability that those ¯rms that declared ¯nancing constraints also
manipulated their balance sheets data to show that their investment was ine±ciently low;
second, we condition for ¯rms size, thus ruling out the possibility that ª
w
i is on average
higher for small ¯rms, which are also more likely to state ¯nancing constraints; third, the
result is not driven by sectorial di®erences: table 10 shows that ¯nancing constraints are
equally distributed inthe di®erent industrial sectors30.Giventhat t b ªw
i;t+1 isanoisy measure
of the intensity of ¯nancing constraints, because of the estimation problems mentioned in
the previous subsection, this consistency result with our qualitative information is very
important.
30The sample used to calculate this table is composed by 897 ¯rms, while only 561 ¯rms have been
used for the estimations, because they provide a richer set of balance sheet information.
246 A formal test of the ¯nancing constraints hypoth-
esis
After verifying that t b ªw
i;t+1 is positively correlated to directly revealed ¯nancing problems,
we test the ¯nancing constraintshypothesis by estimating the relation between t b ªw
i;t+1 and
net ¯nancial wealth ww




















g(:) is a nonlinear function. If the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis is not rejected by the
data, we expect to ¯nd a negative slope of the conditional mean of t b ª
w
i;t+1 with respect to
ww
i;t: Such a slope should be convex: steeper when ww
i;t is very low, then gradually °atter
as w
w















in correspondence with the lowest values of w
w
i;t; are due to a very high cost of a binding
¯nancingconstraint (¸i;t). In this regionthe slope isvery steepbecause the strict concavity
of the production function implies a very high marginal productivity of variable capital.
















in equation (31) is estimated using a nonparametric
estimation method32. The variables used are the following:
Financial wealth: we consider two alternative variables: i) w
1
i;t = net ¯nancial wealth
at the beginning of year t (liquidity plus short term ¯nancial assets33 minus the loans that
have to be repaid before the end of time t); plus the new cash °ow generated during time
t:ii) w2
i;t = net ¯nancial wealth at the beginning of year t:
w1
i;t would be the best estimator of net ¯nancial wealth available for investment at
time t, if time t investment would be productive only from time t+1 on: In reality this is
31We ¯nd an explicit numerical solution of the theretical model for a set of parameters. Then we






i;t; applying to the simulated data the same within-
transformation described above. The parameters are calibrated in order to match the average level of
output and capital in the sample of italian ¯rms. The variance of µt is directly estimated from b µ
f
t : For
details about the calibation of the other parameters see Caggese 2002.
32The estimation of (31) is performed using a local polinomial regression method that ¯ts a locally
weighted least squares regression using raw data near each target observed point. We used the software
package Glassbox.
33The implicit assumption we make, in order to focus only on ¯nancial variables, is that the en-
trepreneurs use the collateral value of the ¯rms' assets at the end of time t ¡ 1 to borrow secured debt
up to the limit, and then maintain the additional resources in the form of ¯nancial assets.
25not always the case, as time t ¯nancial wealth is increased by revenues partly from past
investment and partly from time t investment in variable capital. The more the revenues
from time t investment increase time t ¯nancial wealth, the more our nonlinear estimation
of (31) is biased. Therefore w2
i;t is a less precise but more robust estimator, because it
excludes by construction the time t cash °ow. We eliminate the size e®ect from both
w1
i;t and w2
i;t by scaling these variables by the average size of ¯rm i during the sample






and Et (MPLt+1) do not include the
¯rm speci¯c productivity Ai; we apply the same procedure to w1
i;t and w2













i;t that are the deviations form ¯rm
speci¯c means.










Fixed capital: from ki;t we compute kw
i;t; following the same within transformation
applied to ww
i;t:






by discretising the state
space of its estimator tb µ
f
i;t+1 in 3 equally spaced intervals and by estimating equation
(31) for each interval. Moreover we condition by ki;t by excluding from our analysis the
observations in the fourth quartile of kw
i;t. Figures 12, 13 and 14 show the estimation of
equation (31) for small ¯rms (less than 300 employees) with respectively low, medium
and high productivity shock, using both w1w
i;t and w2w
i;t : The shaded lines represent the
boundaries of the 90% con¯dence interval. The downward sloping relationship predicted
by the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis is con¯rmed for the low and medium productivity
shock observations34 for both w1w
i;t and w2w
i;t (Figures 12 and 13). For w1w
i;t the model
predictions are not con¯rmed for high values of ¯nancial wealth, for which we observe
an upward sloping relationship instead of a °at one. This could be due to one of the
two misspeci¯cation problems mentioned in section 2. Suppose a ¯rm receives a positive
shock between time t ¡ 1 and time t; which increases revenues and ¯nancial wealth at
34The minimum of tb ªw
i;t+1 is lower than zero, and this could be due to one of the reasons mentioned
before: i)the e®ect of the unobservable ´; ii) the bias induced by the elimination of Ai (see footnote n.26);
iii) the overestimation of the user cost of capital, given that we do not explicitly measure tax di®erentials
(see footnote n.??).
26Figure 11: Expected relation between the intensity of ¯nancing constraints and ¯nancial
wealth
the beginning of time t: It could be that this positive shock does not increase investment
during time t either because the shock is entirely transitory, or because of the presence of
convex adjustment costs. For this ¯rm we would observe an high t b ªw
i;t+1; because after a
positive shock capital has not increased, and we would observe also high ¯nancial wealth.
This positive correlation between the two variables would lead us to reject the ¯nancing
constraints hypothesis. This bias should be stronger when using w1w
i;t than when using
w2w
i;t ; because the latter does not include time t cash °ow. This can explain why a positive
relationship between tb ªw
i;t+1 and ww
i;t for high net wealth values, is absent when using w2w
i;t .
It is important to note that if this problem is severe then we increase the chances to
reject rather than to accept the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis. This property increases




i;t estimated in ¯gures 12 and 13 is a strong evidence in favour of the ¯nancing
constraints hypothesis.
In the previous section we argued that the omission of the risk premium in the calcu-
lation of the user cost of capital could a®ect these ¯ndings. This omission has the e®ect
of overestimating t b ª
w
i;t+1 for observations with higher risk premium in the cost of capi-
27tal. Therefore an alternative explanation of the downward sloping relationship between
t b ªw
i;t+1 and ww
i;t; which does not have to do with ¯nancing constraints, is that high t b ªw
i;t+1
observations could be relative to ¯rms with riskier projects, which are on average smaller
and hence less wealthy. A problem with this explanation is that ww
i;t is not an absolute,
but a relative measure of ¯nancial wealth. But even ignoring this point, we think that
this alternative explanation cannot explain our results, because of the magnitude of our
estimated t b ª
w
i;t+1. In fact ¯gure (11) shows that the model predicts, for ¯rms with low
net ¯nancial wealth, that a binding ¯nancing constraint may cause a premium in the ex-
pected marginal productivity of variable capital up to 80%. Such prediction is important
because it is based on technological parameters calibrated from the same panel data of
Italian ¯rms used for the empirical estimation. Figures (12) and (13) not only con¯rm
the downward sloping relationship between t b ªw
i;t+1 and ww
i;t; but also they show a similar
magnitude of t b ªw
i;t+1, around 60%-80%, for ¯rms with low ¯nancial wealth. Even if the
omitted risk factor contributes to this result, it probably does not fully explain it, given
its size.
Figure 12: Estimated relation between the intensity of ¯nancing constraints and ¯nancial
wealth - small ¯rms - low productivity
Observations with high productivity shock in ¯gure 14 instead exhibit a slightly up-
ward sloping relationship between ww
i;t and t b ªw
i;t+1: Also in this case such relationship is
28Figure 13: Estimated relation between the intensity of ¯nancing constraints and ¯nancial
wealth - small ¯rms - medium productivity
Figure 14: Estimated relation between the intensity of ¯nancing constraints and ¯nancial
wealth - small ¯rms - high productivity
29more pronounced for w
1w
i;t : Thisis probably caused by the fact that, for these ¯rm-year ob-
servations with higher productivity shocks, the two misspeci¯cation problems mentioned
in section 2 are more severe, and as a consequence we reject the ¯nancing constraints
hypothesis. This interpretation is supported by the qualitative information in ¯gure 15:
in the subset of observations of small ¯rms with high productivity shock the probability
of stating ¯nancing constraints is not correlated with the value of ª
w
i :
Figure 15: Relation between stated ¯nancing problems and the ¯nancing constraints
indicator - small ¯rms
Probit regression and productivity shock levels: rationj
i=a0+a1? w





































Total obs 126 133 93
Standard error in parenthesis; 1: More than 300 employees; 2: Less than 300 employees; * Significant at 90% confidence level;
** significant at 95% confidence level; *** significant at 99% confidence level; rationi = 1 if the entrepreneur stated financing
constraints, and 0 otherwise;? ?
w
i
 = average value of the premium in the expected productivity of variable capital; dimi =
dimension in number of employees;
The regression results in ¯gure 8 also suggest that the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis
should be rejected for larger ¯rms, for which ª
w
i is not related to ¯nancing constraints.
Figure 16 con¯rms this. The estimation of equation (31) rejects the predictions of the
model, showing instead an upward sloping relationship between t b ªw
i;t+1 and ww
i;t. As before
this upward sloping relation is steeper for w
1w
i;t than for w
2w
i;t and it could again be caused
by the two misspeci¯cation problems mentioned before.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we illustrated a structural model of ¯rm investment with ¯nancing and
irreversibility constraints. The model indicates that the premium of expected marginal
productivityover the user cost ofvariable capital isthe best available indicator of ¯nancing
30Figure 16: Estimated relation between the intensity of ¯nancing constraints and ¯nancial
wealth - large ¯rms
constraints on ¯rm investment. We estimated this indicator for a sample of small and
medium Italian manufacturing ¯rms, and we tested and did not reject the presence of
¯nancing constraints for all the ¯rms in the sample except the larger ones. The robustness
of this result has been con¯rmed by an independent source of qualitative information
available for the same sample: conditional on their size, ¯rms with an high value of the
¯nancing constraints indicator are three times more likely to state problems in ¯nancing
new investment projects than ¯rms with a low value.
The ¯nancing constraints test proposed in this paper has two major advantages with
respect to previous empirical studies. First, it is theoretically consistent, and robust to
the criticism raised by Kaplan and Zingales (1997 and 2000) to the previous studies which
detected the presence of ¯nancing constraints focusing on the correlation between cash
°ow and ¯xed investment. Secondly, even if we ignore this criticism, another important
advantage of our approach is that, in the presence of estimation errors, the test is likely
to be biased towards rejecting the ¯nancing constraints hypothesis when it is true, while
the cash °ow-investment type of test is likely to be biased towards not rejecting it when
it is false. This is because the studies that focus on the correlation between cash °ow and
31¯xed investment carry out the following test: if ¯nancing constraints a®ect ¯rms ¯xed
investment decisions, then we predict that the expected marginal productivity of ¯xed
capital (summarised by Tobin's Q) is not a su±cient statistic for determining investment
decisions, which are also positively a®ected by cash °ow. The problem is that in practice,
with or without ¯nancing constraints, investment in ¯xed capital, Tobin's Q and cash °ow
are all highly positively correlated, due to the presence of adjustment costs. Therefore if
Tobin's Q is not properly estimated, this is likely to increase the signi¯cance of cash °ow
in the investment equation, and hence to bias the test towards not rejecting the ¯nancing
constraints hypothesis when this is false.
On the contrary our test is based on estimating the correlation between marginal
productivity of variable capital and net ¯nancial wealth. The ¯nancing constraints hy-
pothesis predicts a negative relationship between the two variables. But since variable
capital is less subject to adjustment costs than ¯xed capital then in the absence of ¯nanc-
ing constraints the two variables should not be correlated. Moreover even if adjustment
costs are present, or if we estimate with error the productivity shock, it is more likely
that we detect a positive relationship between marginal productivity of variable capital
and net ¯nancial wealth, rather than the opposite, and hence we would tend to reject the
¯nancing constraints hypothesis when this is true.
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Appendix 1
We describe here the variables used in the estimation of the production function:
p
y
tYi;t: total revenues realised during year t; at current prices.
pk
tKi;t: we compute pk
tKi;t as the sum of the replacement value of two di®erent kind of
¯xed capital: i) plants and equipment; ii) intangible ¯xed capital (Software, Advertising,
Research and Development). In the theoretical model we assume that it takes one period
for ¯xed and variable capital to become productive. In reality the time lag necessary to
install the newcapital islessthanone year, andmost likely aroundor lessthan six months.
Therefore we include in pk
tKi;t all capital purchased before the end of time t: Balance sheet
data about ¯xed assets do not re°ect their replacement value, for at least two reasons:
¯rst, the depreciation rate applied for accounting purposes is very variable and does not
coincide with the physical depreciation rate; second, all values are "historical", and donot
take into account the appreciation of the assets in nominal terms. Hence, to compute the

















J=f1,2g; where 1=plant and equipment and 2= intangible ¯xed capital . ¼1 = % change
in the producer prices index for agricultural and industrial machinery (source: OECD,
from Datastream); ¼2 = % change in the producer prices index (source: OECD, from
Datastream). ±
j are estimated separately for the 20 manufacturing sectorsusingaggregate
annual data about the replacement value and the total depreciation of the capital (source:
Italian National Institute of Statistic). Given that within each sector depreciation rates
vary only marginally between years, we conveniently used the yearly average: ±
1 ranges
from 9.3% to 10.7%, and ±
2 from 8.4% to 10.6%.
pl
tLi;t : this variable is computed in the following way: beginning of the period t
working capital inventories (materials, work in progress and ¯nished products), plus new
purchases of materials in period t; minus end of period t working capital inventories. Also
in this case the time lag necessary to transform variable inputs in revenues is much less
than one year. Therefore we assume that all the variable inputs that are in stock at the
beginning of year t will contribute to generate year t revenues. By subtracting the end of
34period t working capital inventories we also assume that a fraction of the new purchases
of materials during period t contributes to period t revenues, while the remaining part
represents investment in the variable capital that will become productive in period t+1 .
pn
t Ni;t : this variable includes the total cost of the labour and the services used in year
t:
In order to transform the variables in real terms, we used the following price indexes
(source: ISTAT):
Output Y T
i;t: consumer prices index relative to all products excluding services.
Fixed capital Ki;t : producer price index of durable inputs.
Labour Ni;t : wage earnings index of the manufacturing sector.
Variable capital Li;t : wholesale price index for intermediate goods.
Appendix 2
This appendix describes the testing procedure adopted to determine the appropriate
estimation method of equation (22). The time dimension of the data, 11 annual observa-
tions, is too short to allow the consistent estimation of lnAi and of the moments of the
distribution of lnÂs;t and ln"t: Given that the number of ¯rms in the sample is large we
can estimate ln"t and lnÂs;t as ¯xed e®ects. We can also transform the data to eliminate
the unobservable lnAi. The ¯rm idiosyncratic shock lnµ
f
i;t can neither be estimated as a
¯xed e®ect, nor eliminated through a transformation of the data. In the theoretical model
we assume that lnµ
f
i;t is not observed by E before she decides ki;t and li;t at time t: If this
is true, and if ½ = 0; then cov(lnµ
f
i;t; lnzi;t) = 0 for z 2 fk;l;ng: Unfortunately this is not
necessarily true in reality. Even assuming that ½ = 0; we can still expect lnµ
f
i;t to be at
least partially correlated with lnzi;t: This is because the duration of a cycle of production
is most likely lower than one year, that is the frequency of our data: In order to correct
this problem we use an instrumental variables estimation technique. Lagged lnzi;t¡j with
z 2 fk; l; ng and with j ¸ 1 are natural candidates as instruments, but their validity
depends on the degree of serial correlation in lnµ
f
i;t. In practice some of the persistency
in productivity shocks is likely to be captured by the economy wide and industry speci¯c
shocks ln"t and lnÂs;t: Moreover the permanent di®erences in lnµ
f
i;t between ¯rms are
captured by the ¯xed e®ect Ai. Therefore the residual persistency of lnµ
f
i;t should be
quite low, and this means that lagged right hand side variables can be valid instruments.
We test the exogeneity of fzi;1; :::; zi;Tg; for z 2 (k; l; n) by estimating the linearised sys-
tem (22) with a GMM estimator. This allows, when the number of instruments is greater
than the number of parameters to estimate, to test the validity of the instruments with
the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. We choose as instruments two lags of the
right hand side variables
35.
In¯gure 17 we compare the testsfor the overidentifying restrictions obtainedusinglags
-1 and -2 with the one obtained using lags 0 and -1. If independent variables fzi;1; :::; zi;Tg
are contemporaneously correlated with µ
f
i;t, but the persistency of lnµ
f
i;t is not very high,
then we expect only the 0 and -1 instruments to be rejected. Figure 17 shows that both
sets of instruments are not rejected in four out of seven groups, while in the remaining
three the lags 0&1 speci¯cation is close to rejection, with a P-value around 0.10-0.18.
Given that the j-test is usually biased towards accepting the model when it should be
rejected, we interpret this result as evidence of some endogeneity problem, and we decide
to adopt the lags 1&2 speci¯cation, and to use it on all the groups, for homogeneity.
35We prefer not to increase the number of lags because additional lagged instruments did not improve
the e±ciency of the estimates. Therefore, given that the number of ¯rms per group is relatively small,
we prefer not to reduce excessively the number of degrees of freedom.
35Figure 17: Test of the validity of the instruments
Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 Group 7
Instruments: zi,t-s with s=0,1 and z={k,l,n}
j test 35.1 44.5 35.1 43.5 47 45.9 35.7
d.f. 37 37 37 37 36* 36* 36*
Pr.(j)<? 2(d.f.) 0.56 0.18 0.56 0.22 0.1 0.12 0.48
Instruments: zi,t-s with s=1,2 and z={k,l,n}
j test 38.9 37.8 39.87 39.71 41.26 42.2 33.64
d.f. 37 37 37 37 36* 36* 36*
Pr.(j)<?
2(d.f.) 0.38 0.43 0.34 0.35 0.25 0.22 0.58
N. firms 78 49 117 63 80 66 108
N. observations 624 392 936 504 640 528 864
*One coefficient relative to a two-digit sector dummy variable is estimated
The discussion above and ¯gure 17 justify the choice of the Generalised Method of
Moments(GMM) asthe estimation method36. We ¯rst eliminate the ¯rm speci¯c e®ect Ai:
The within-¯rm transformation would be the obvious choice to do it, but unfortunately it
is not consistent when we use laggedright handside variablesas instrumentsto correct for
the correlation between lnµ
f
i;t and lnzi;t; for z 2 fk; l; ng. We therefore adopt the forward
orthogonal transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995). This is equivalent to
a "forward within transformation" that remains consistent when lagged instruments are
used37. We then stack the observations in 8 cross sectional equations, for the years 1985
to 1992. This means that we exclude year 1982, in order to diminish possible distortions
caused by the perpetual inventory method, and we have the data from 1983 and 1984
available as instruments. We estimate the system (32), where the symbol ¤ denotes the
transformed variables, imposing the equality of parameters across equations:
lny¤












i;85 = c85 + dts +® lnk
¤
i;85 +¯ lnli;85 + °lnni;85 +lnµi;85
(32)
d and c are two digit I.S.T.A.T. sector and year speci¯c dummy variables respectively,
and capture the e®ect of lnÂs;t and ln"t. Figure 4 reports estimation results using
lnki;t¡j;lnli;t¡j and lnni;t¡j with j 2 f1; 2g, as instrumental variables
38.








T¡t+1 (zi;t +zi;t+1 + :::+ zi;T)
i
:
38Whenever possible one group is composed by one speci¯c two digit I.S.T.A.T. sector. This is the
case for groups 1 and 5. Hence the coe±cient dts is omitted, in that it would be perfectly collinear with
the constant c. The other groups are composed by ¯rms in more than one 2-digits sector, because each
sector has a too low number of ¯rms. Here we include the coe±cient dts only if it shows a signi¯cant
deviation from the constant:
36